

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 4 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 686th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference, and on my own behalf, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, His Excellency Mr. Amre Moussa, who will be our first speaker today. As most of you will recall, the Foreign Minister has already addressed the Conference on a previous occasion, and his presence among us today is a further testimony to the continued importance attached by Egypt to this multilateral forum. I am sure that the Minister's statement will be followed by all of us with great interest and will give further impetus to our efforts.

I also have pleasure in welcoming yet again this year the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, who will also be addressing the Conference. I am sure that his visit to us at this crucial time in our negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty will be a source of encouragement in our endeavours.

Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words. It gives me great pleasure to once again address the Conference on Disarmament, especially at this important juncture in its work. I am particularly pleased to do so while you, the Permanent Representative of a friendly and sisterly country, Indonesia, are presiding over the Conference. Your country is also the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement to whose principles Egypt adheres and of which Egypt is a very loyal member.

On this occasion, I would also like to express my pleasure for the appointment of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky as Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament. I have known Mr. Petrovsky for a long time. His vast knowledge and commitment to promoting disarmament and prospects for peace can only bode well for the future of your work here.

The world today is in a state of flux which, on the one hand, would provide us with an opportunity to reshape our relations, and redirect our efforts towards the establishment of a community of nations based on equality, peace and security for all, but on the other hand, that state of flux embodies many risks and brings with it deep-rooted anxieties. It has challenged and tested many of the fundamental pillars upon which international relations have been based, by flaunting the rule of law and the respect for humanity, as we see in Bosnia and elsewhere. This state of affairs, if not resolutely responded to, threatens to tear the very fabric of the community of nations and its societies, as well as discredit and devalue even the most lofty and eloquent commitments to what we are talking about, a new world order.

In our attempts to take advantage of the opportunities that lie before us, and in our struggle to ensure that the appalling events of recent years do not drag us down with them, security for our peoples and nations will always remain at the forefront of our concerns. Since disarmament is a major component of security, your work here in the months to come will, we do believe, have a lasting effect on the future of international relations.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

In determining its positions on security and disarmament issues, Egypt, like every other State in the community of nations, takes as its primordial concern their implications for its national interests in general, and for the safety of its people and sanctity of its territory. The first question that comes to mind is the implication of any suggested measure for our national security within our direct regional context, i.e. the Middle East, Africa and the Mediterranean.

Egypt is committed to the achievement of security at the lowest level of armaments. In this context, in order for us to take a positive position vis-à-vis any disarmament measure, three fundamental criteria have to be satisfied from a regional perspective.

Firstly, disarmament measures have to result in an enhanced security balance in our region. The military dimension of security in any region involves a complex and complicated mix of checks and balances. Consequently, while we do not advocate an arbitrary linkage of all disarmament measures, it is impossible to decouple any measure from the overall military matrix which determines security. In other words, any measure will be judged not only on its own merit, but also in light of overall parallel measures that would be necessary to enhance regional security.

Secondly, disarmament measures have to effectively lead to lower levels of armament. The world in general and our region in particular suffers gravely from over-armament. For disarmament measures to enhance security they should not, and cannot, be stop-gap measures, simply consolidating the status quo under the guise of pragmatism or realism or any other pretext. We must look critically at all the components of threat attributable to a weapons system, i.e. destructive capacity, quantity, effectiveness, imports, domestic capabilities, stockpiles, etc. Where limited measures are necessary, they must, within a clearly defined time-frame, be locked in with an unambiguous commitment to move towards the ultimate objective of prohibiting the weapons system and achieving reductions to levels that are not perceived to be threatening by their neighbours. This, in addition to the element of general transparency, especially in the domain of weapons of mass destruction.

Thirdly, disarmament measures in a regional context must be all-encompassing. In attempting to achieve security we are embarking on an objective which by nature is long-term and which progressively - under ideal circumstances - should lead to indefinite prohibitions or reductions. Therefore, for these measures to be sustainable we must strive for equal legal obligations for all States within a region. Anything less cannot withstand the test of time. This is especially valid with respect to States in one region which have acquired the weapons system or have the capability to do so.

In spite of the many difficulties that remain, our regional circumstances today are much more conducive to the adoption of concrete and far-reaching disarmament measures than they were just a few months ago.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Political developments in South Africa, and progress towards the development of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in our continent, are major contributions towards the enhancement of security in Africa, in spite of the human tragedy which we have seen in Somalia and Rwanda.

We have seen the birth of a constructive dialogue within a forum of Mediterranean countries, north and south, that met recently in Alexandria, Egypt. While disarmament is not yet a subject of consideration in this forum, the cooperative engagement which was evident towards dealing with the issues of the Mediterranean will no doubt have positive implications on the overall security perceptions of Mediterranean States.

In the Middle East, the doors of peace which Egypt nudged ajar years ago are now wide open, and the winds of hope and prosperity pass freely. The peoples of this region are determined to resolve their historic conflicts, and to chart a new Middle East which would by necessity include a regime for arms control and regional security. We are hopeful that the recent developments between Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and progress on both the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, will give impetus to the early conclusion of such a regime, with the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological. This regime must also entail the application of full-scope safeguards to nuclear facilities and the adherence of all the States of the region, including Israel, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and here I wish to reiterate that a truly new matrix of relations in the Middle East will not materialize without such a regime that is equitable and fair in so far as disarmament and weapons control is concerned. Any policy that would reflect inconsistencies, favouritism or double standards will not work. It will sow havoc again in the Middle East.

A number of nuclear issues are before this session of the CD. The Final Declaration of the eleventh Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement held recently in Cairo addressed many of these issues given the approach of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Egypt fully supports the positions outlined in the Final Declaration. At the same time, in light of the importance of these issues I would like to share with you a few additional reflections in this regard.

First, after long years of deadlock, the Conference on Disarmament has finally engaged in a negotiating process which should result in a comprehensive test-ban treaty, thus halting definitively all nuclear tests, in all environments, for all times. We are hopeful that such a treaty will indeed prevent horizontal proliferation and the emergence of any new nuclear-weapon States, and cap any further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should not, however, be a reason for complacency. Experience has shown that testing is not the only indispensable road that leads to a nuclear capability. It is therefore a must that a CTBT be rapidly and effectively complemented by other long-overdue nuclear disarmament measures.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

Second, as long as vast arsenals of nuclear arms are scattered in many parts of the world, the question of negative security assurances will continue to be one of major importance to non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly those who have definitively renounced the nuclear option. It is truly regrettable that States which have legally forsaken the nuclear option have not received such guarantees, in a legally binding instrument. The signs are far from encouraging because some continue to insist that unilateral or plurilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States which are not legally binding would be enough to provide such assurances. I can only hope that, in the little time remaining during the third part of the CD's 1994 session, a breakthrough will occur on negative security assurances.

Third, we are happy to note that it is generally agreed that the Conference on Disarmament is an appropriate forum to deal with the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Egypt fully favours the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the CD with a mandate to negotiate a multilateral treaty banning any further production of any weapons usable fissile material. However, such a treaty, in order to be effectively verifiable, must lead the way towards dealing appropriately with existing stockpiles of those materials, through the progressive transfer of these stockpiles to international control prior to rendering them unusable.

Fourth, I note with regret that, despite repeated calls by a large number of States, including Egypt, there continues to be a strong resistance, if not outright opposition, by some countries, which reject the idea of applying effective measures of transparency to weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, the accumulation of which is both excessive and destabilizing. When I last addressed the Conference on Disarmament, in January 1993, I asked why it was that weapons of mass destruction and their relevant technology were not covered by transparency measures. I have yet to receive a convincing answer to that question. Excluding weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, from the transparency drive and from the United Nations Register will result in a significantly weakened Register, a decidedly weakened Register, and will severely undermine its vocation as a confidence-building and early-warning mechanism aimed at averting potential aggression or threats to international peace and security.

The months remaining prior to convening the 1995 NPT Review Conference provide us with a unique opportunity to achieve significant progress in nuclear disarmament and arms control. Certain measures are truly necessary. Measures ensuring the universality of the NPT, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, adequate negative security assurances, serious ongoing work on an effective cut-off treaty, and a renewed credible commitment for nuclear disarmament would augur well for a successful NPT Review Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HOLUM (United States of America): I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament again during its session this year. First, Mr. President, may I congratulate you on the skilful way in which you have conducted the business of the CD during your presidency; I know that the United States delegation has provided you with its fullest cooperation. I would also like to extend once again my greetings to Mr. Petrovsky, the CD Secretary-General, and to his deputy, Mr. Bensmail. We appreciate the efforts you are making on behalf of all of us in facilitating our negotiations. Also, we are very pleased that Foreign Minister Moussa could be with us today and have listened with great care to his thoughtful speech.

The Conference on Disarmament has accomplished a great deal in recent years, and much since its opening in January. In one sense, our progress in the CD is more than any of us had a right to expect - a testament to the abilities of this body. But in another sense our recent efforts are not enough. The United States is more committed than ever to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible time. None of us can rest - none can be satisfied by our noteworthy progress to date - until the world's nations have agreed once and for all to stop testing nuclear weapons. So I am here neither to criticize the CD nor praise it unconditionally, but rather to exhort it.

Last January I was privileged to report to you President Clinton's commitment to achievement of a comprehensive test ban "at the earliest possible time". Six months later, he has asked me to return here to tell you that those instructions to our delegation remain fully in effect and that "earliest possible time" means just what it says. It most assuredly is not diplomatic code for "a relaxed pace". It does not mean take all the time allowed by United States law. It means take only the time necessary, negotiating diligently and in good faith, to write a sound treaty.

President Clinton's commitment to the test ban is authenticated by another decision, our continued moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite China's tests, President Clinton has extended our moratorium for a third year, through September of 1995.

I ask you to consider carefully what that means. The President's decision to extend the testing moratorium balanced the potential value of additional tests against restraint by others, against the impact on our non-proliferation goals, and against progress in the test-ban negotiations here. In practical effect, this means that, where the United States is concerned, the central and profound policy decision that many seek has already been made. If things here and elsewhere go as we hope, the testing moratorium the United States adopted in 1992 will last forever. This practical reality is underscored by the President's definitive declaration to the United Nations General Assembly last September, when he said, "In the face of disturbing signs, I renew my call on the nuclear States to abide by that moratorium as we

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negotiate to stop nuclear testing for all time". Simply put, we are prepared for the conclusion that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear test, that we will never test again.

As we contemplate that reality, these negotiations - and other developments, including preparations for the NPT Conference next year - should be given even greater energy and purpose. The United States seeks a CTBT that will bring an end to all nuclear explosions, period. No thresholds. No exceptions. And by that I mean not just all explosions, but all States. Success demands in particular the full support and participation of all five nuclear-weapon States. And we seek universal adherence.

Of course, the United States and the other nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility in this negotiation, and of course we also have special experience and knowledge that can aid it considerably. So we will continue to work closely with the other nuclear-weapon States to propel this effort toward fruition.

I wish to commend Ambassador Marín Bosch, Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, as he accelerates the Committee's work. The United States supports his efforts to develop a complete text from contributions developed in the working groups on verification and on legal and institutional issues under the leadership, respectively, of Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski. Nevertheless, much time has passed and much work remains to be done. We need a document that will both focus and energize our work. And we look to the Committee Chairman for his leadership to bring this about.

Now, when I last spoke to you, I said the United States would be out front pulling in these negotiations, rather than in the back dragging its heels. We plan to persist in, and indeed, to intensify, our efforts to fulfil the President's instructions. So I urge the Conference to make use of all the time possibly available to it, even outside the normal term of the CD, to move these negotiations forward. The United States delegation is prepared to work continuously in the NTB Committee and its working groups in the period after 7 September and prior to the opening of the 1995 session so as to make all possible progress this year and prior to the start of the NPT Extension Conference in April 1995.

A kind of linkage has grown in the minds of some between the NPT Extension Conference and progress in other areas. All parts of the international arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament architecture are, of course, interrelated. But it is a disservice to major regimes or initiatives to posit any kind of rigid "quid-pro-quo" relationship between them. The NPT should be extended because of its own intense merits to world peace. A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is an opportunity whose time has arrived. We should seize it not because it goes well with NPT, but because it deserves to be done.

Another major initiative being undertaken here deserves the CD's independent attention: the fissile material cut-off. Such a global convention would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear

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explosives or outside international safeguards. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of non-NPT States under some measure of restraint for the first time. And it would likewise halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon States.

President Clinton committed the United States to negotiation of such a cut-off when he appeared before the United Nations General Assembly last September. The General Assembly subsequently passed, by consensus, a resolution recommending negotiation of such a ban, "in the most appropriate international forum". In January of this year, the CD responded by appointing Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon as Special Coordinator to consult with CD States on the ways and means to negotiate a cut-off convention. He has ably pursued this task and established that a consensus exists in the CD to negotiate the treaty in this forum. I urge the CD to adopt a simple negotiating mandate based on the consensus agreement recorded in the General Assembly's resolution. Such a mandate would establish an ad hoc committee and direct it to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

The CD needs to move forward decisively in this matter - not only to reduce the threat posed by the continued production of fissile material, but to silence the voices that whisper it cannot handle two major responsibilities at the same time. I know all this takes resources, attention, and commitment. We will continue to provide Ambassador Ledogar with everything he needs to help accomplish the ambitious goals I have come here to address.

Security assurances are another matter holding significant promise. For many years, the CD has conducted valuable work on negative assurances. The United States supports a "two-track" approach to NSA: discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee, and discussions among the nuclear-weapon States. We will continue to work vigorously in both forums, and I congratulate Ambassador Guillaume for his leadership this year in the former.

And while we are hard at work with the other nuclear-weapon States, the United States presidential commitment stands. Our unilateral commitment stresses that assurances will be provided to non-nuclear States that are parties to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco unless the United States is attacked by that non-nuclear-weapon State in alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

I would not want to speak at the Conference on Disarmament without addressing an issue which is on the minds of many - expansion of CD membership. The United States continues to favour strongly expansion of the Conference. We regret that it has not been possible to achieve such expansion due to the impediment which we have identified, namely, the inappropriate inclusion of any State under comprehensive Security Council sanctions, according to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The

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United States remains willing to consider any reasonable initiative designed to resolve this situation, and we believe the CD is the proper forum to find an appropriate solution.

President John Kennedy was fond of saying that from those to whom much has been given, much is expected. The CD's remarkable success with the CWC and its notable progress on the CTBT prove it is a body of great ability. And so the world expects much of it, of you.

One of the encouraging trends of these times has been the ability of the international community to clear away much of the divisive ideological and political underbrush that occupied so much time, to so little effect, during the era of maximum East-West and North-South confrontation. Of course, those habits have not entirely disappeared. My appeal to you is that, to the extent that such inclinations persist, this is the last place they should be exercised. For the CD is not a place for scoring political points, but for doing serious work and producing tangible results. Indeed, in a world where even bilateral arms control has become multilateral, this institution, the able statesmen and experts who labour here, and the extraordinary and intricate methods of diplomacy you have mastered here, have become the wave of the future and the embodiment of our hopes for a safer world.

With the end of the cold war, nuclear proliferation pressures may be more substantial than ever. Such pressures, as you know, can be vertical as well as horizontal. So this is at once the best time to buttress international security and the most essential time. Now especially, with the largest nuclear-weapon Powers finally able to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in their defence planning, this is no time to revert to old habits.

We have now had five decades of nuclear testing and are in the fifth decade of calls to stop it. By any fair description, the world's pursuit of a CTBT has been a long-distance race. Such races are not won by limping across the finish line, or even by being satisfied with moderate progress. They are won with concluding surges of energy and commitment. We are in the final stages of our race. The finish line is within our view. We must pick up the pace. We must agree to cease nuclear explosive testing without exceptions, without artificial linkages, without delay - to conclude a CTBT before the chance of our lifetimes has passed.

It is an intriguing historical coincidence that the fifteenth anniversary of the first nuclear explosion and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT fall in the same year, 1995. I hope our efforts can make this coincidence into an important signpost of progress.

From the very first atomic blast at Alamogordo, mankind has been struggling to free itself from the ferocious beast unleashed there. Since then, thousands of women and men of good will and intellect have pursued - passionately, painstakingly - the compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us rededicate ourselves to that mission: to shepherd this beast back into its cage, to bring what was unleashed in a blinding blast of heat in

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the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva, to ensure that our first half-century of nuclear explosions is our last.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Holum for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, accept the warm congratulations of my delegation for the manner in which you have been conducting the work of this Conference. Indonesia and Mexico have worked closely in many fields, including that of nuclear disarmament, a subject we shall address today. But first, permit me to extend a cordial welcome to our colleague from the Netherlands and to wish all the best to Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Benhima. The presence of Foreign Minister Amre Moussa is testimony to the importance his Government attaches to this forum in particular and to disarmament in general. We also listened with interest to the remarks by Mr. John Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly, very particularly to his appeal to proceed towards the achievement of a CTBT.

The fact that Mexico is taking the floor immediately after the United States and just before Canada does not mean a concerted effort in this forum by the countries belonging to the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA.

On the eve of the forty-ninth anniversary of the atomic bombs that fell on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the delegation of Mexico would like to make a brief statement on the problem facing the international community with regard to nuclear proliferation.

Our long struggle for nuclear disarmament, which includes the chapter on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whose full implementation is happily about to be attained, is known to all. We consider the chairmanship of the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee as a recognition of our efforts in this field. So far this year the Committee has made important progress but we feel we could and should work more quickly, especially with a view to the drawing up of a rolling text, which would undoubtedly facilitate the negotiation of a CTBT. That, in turn, would contribute to the success of the 1995 Conference on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The task of the 1995 NPT Conference is twofold: to carry out the fifth five-year review of the Treaty's operation and to decide on the Treaty's extension. When the NPT was negotiated in the mid-1960s, no one could foresee the evolution of the international situation, let alone the dramatic changes of recent years. But the negotiators did have a clear idea of the need to review periodically the operation of the Treaty and, in the light of those reviews, to determine whether or not to extend it indefinitely. Thus the provisions of articles VIII (para. 3) and X (para. 2).

Whereas many countries have already stated that the NPT should be extended indefinitely, others have yet to make a final decision. It seems

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

premature to have decided to extend the NPT years before the 1995 Conference and the examination in depth of its operation. That Conference and its ongoing preparatory process offer the international community a good opportunity to consider in detail the Treaty's operation and to chart a strategy that will ensure not only the continuity of the NPT but full compliance with its provisions as well.

The situation today regarding the proliferation - vertical as well as horizontal - of nuclear weapons is very different from that of the 1960s. First, there are many more thousands of nuclear weapons now than there were 25 years ago. Second, there is much more weapons-grade nuclear material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). Third, enormous advances have been made regarding nuclear technology in general. And fourth, the physical control of nuclear materials is far more difficult, and in some instances it seems to exceed the capabilities of the nation-State.

All of this has changed some of the NPT's basic assumptions. For example, one can no longer divide the world neatly between five nuclear-weapon States and all other countries. There are nations that perhaps already have a small number of nuclear devices. Then there is South Africa, the first ex-nuclear-weapon State. A third category includes the de facto nuclear-weapon States, i.e., those States that "inherited" nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). And finally, some non-nuclear-weapon States could be described as "near"-nuclear-weapon States, either because they already have the necessary components and technology or because they could easily acquire them. The foregoing constitutes a set of questions that must, we feel, be addressed.

Another set of problems derives from the fact that some of the NPT's provisions are now perceived as obsolete or much less relevant. For example, peaceful nuclear explosions were once considered to hold the key to many engineering and other civilian projects; but today, because of concern about their effects and the impossibility of distinguishing between a peaceful and a military nuclear device, environmental and non-proliferation considerations have become paramount.

But the fundamental question that all the parties to the NPT will have to examine in 1995 is whether or not they have lived up to the bargain struck in 1970: non-nuclear-weapon States would forego the nuclear option and nuclear-weapon States move towards nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Some NPT parties have described doomsday scenarios if the Treaty is not extended indefinitely and unconditionally. Others fear that such an extension might postpone indefinitely the full implementation of article VI and thus render permanent the present temporary nuclear status of some States. The fact is that we are already facing a very delicate situation regarding nuclear proliferation.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

All NPT parties, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, must be convinced that the decision regarding its extension not only enhances their own security but also improves the non-proliferation regime in general. And that will not be an easy task. To facilitate it, the nuclear-weapon States should put forward the elements of a nuclear disarmament programme, including: (a) the reiteration of the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, (b) future bilateral steps between the Russian Federation and the United States with a view to reducing their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels contemplated in START I and II, and (c) the measures that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in the light of the above-mentioned reductions, that is, the point at which they too will become involved in a multilateral nuclear disarmament process.

This raises the need for greater transparency in the nuclear field. Discussions regarding article VI of the NPT must be thorough and based on hard facts, not wishful thinking. Are the existing nuclear arsenals still being improved or not? In other words, has the qualitative nuclear arms race finally ceased? And, if not, which nuclear-weapon States are still pursuing major improvements of their stockpiles and why? Unlike nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT are subject to periodic international scrutiny. The Treaty's five-year reviews should be used, among other things, to evaluate the activities of the nuclear-weapon States. And this will be all the more relevant as we approach the decision to extend the Treaty.

Moreover, it would be advisable for all parties to the NPT to agree sufficiently in advance of the 1995 Conference on a series of measures aimed at bolstering the present regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would ensure the success of the 1995 Conference. And it could be achieved through the conclusion of a series of multilateral agreements, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the prohibition of the production of fissile material and legally-binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, nor will they be threatened with their use.

Quite obviously, some will consider the foregoing as an ambitious nuclear disarmament programme. But it is also obvious that the present international climate is conducive to it and that the NPT's provisions require it.

For decades the nuclear arms race was seen as both a cause and an effect of East/West confrontation. Nuclear disarmament (as opposed to nuclear "arms control") was never seriously contemplated. The NPT, itself a product of the super-Powers' shared concern with horizontal proliferation, speaks of the need "to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery". East/West tensions have certainly "eased" and trust between States has been strengthened, and yet not all States are willing (or ready) to move

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towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This is due in part to the inertia of cold-war thinking and an attachment to nuclear postures which, although never widely accepted, are now certainly obsolete.

To conclude, we should like to insist that, when examining the contents of its agenda, the Conference on Disarmament consider also the problem of nuclear non-proliferation, as well as the broader question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in all its aspects. We made this suggestion a few years ago and we reiterate it now. The discussion of those subjects could serve us as a compass to chart a future course. It has been but a short while - with the intensification of the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention (whose instrument of ratification my Government is about to deposit) and now with the CTBT negotiations - since the Conference on Disarmament forsook the indolent charm that characterized it for many years - I repeat, for many years. We are now in a situation to play to the full the role for which the Conference was created.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, who will speak in his capacity as Special Coordinator on "cut-off".

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, in taking the floor for the second time under your presidency, may I also congratulate you once again on your skilful management of the Conference. I am pleased to be in this forum in a trilogy of North American countries to speak. I would only suggest that, if we are to be regarded as forming a conspiracy, we will have to improve on our coordination in order to make it less obvious.

Since I last reported to the plenary on June 30, I have continued to work towards obtaining agreement on a negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I continue to believe that the agreement reached at the United Nations General Assembly last fall, which was supported by all delegations, can and should be carried forward so that the international community does not lose the opportunity to launch negotiations on a cut-off treaty prior to the end of this session. It is important that we sustain the momentum begun with the General Assembly resolution last fall and continued with the consensus achieved here with the appointment of a Special Coordinator and with the consensus reached that the CD is the appropriate forum for the negotiation of such a treaty.

In my June 30 report I expressed the view that I would consider convening one or two technical sessions, and also open-ended sessions for a general discussion of the issues involved in a cut-off. I would still like to see this take place and would be pleased to encourage the Conference to approve such sessions but, in view of time constraints we face, I believe we should first concentrate our efforts on reaching agreement on a mandate. It would be more productive to hold these sessions once the ad hoc committee has been

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established and appropriately mandated. Given the importance of this issue to Canada and the need to move expeditiously, my Government is currently undertaking démarches in many capitals with a view to obtaining support for a mandate modelled on the General Assembly resolution.

As of today, not much more than four weeks remain until the conclusion of the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Thus the need to reach agreement on the formation of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate is pressing and urgent. A failure during the present session of the CD to reach agreement on a mandate will in all likelihood result in the return of "cut-off" to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly for further consideration and debate. Some delegations here seem to be of the view that this fall's General Assembly can improve on the consensus resolution reached last year by adding some additional elements to it; or they may at least believe that, having failed to secure an improved resolution, they can easily recreate the agreement reached at the Assembly's forty-eighth session. I do not share the optimism of those delegations. In my view, it is highly unlikely that consensus could be reached on a General Assembly resolution which differed in substance from the 1993 resolution. And in my view it is also questionable whether the consensus that produced last year's breakthrough resolution can easily be reproduced again. Bear in mind that these issues are more clearly defined now, after the consultations we have held here. The differences in our respective approaches to a cut-off treaty probably are reconcilable in detailed negotiation involving both experts and policy decision-makers. But they are not, in my view, easily reconciled in mandate language.

We must, therefore, avoid the temptation to negotiate the substantive issues before the negotiating committee is established. There will be time and opportunity to delve fully into all the substantive matters once the negotiation is launched in the appropriate ad hoc committee. The current session of the CD represents the last viable opportunity, in my view, to draft an appropriate negotiating mandate. The adoption of a negotiating mandate and creation of an ad hoc committee would not, in my view, preclude the discussion by delegations of the appropriate scope of the convention in that committee.

Some delegations have also expressed the concern that they would be unable to service a new negotiation in the current 1994 session of the CD because of the already fully loaded agenda. Although it would of course be for the ad hoc committee itself to decide on its pace of work, let me assure those delegations that from my perspective at least, assuming the creation of the committee, I would expect a programme of work that recognized this fact and did not commence with an active negotiation between now and the end of the 1994 session.

I would instead anticipate one or two planning meetings for such a committee, which could elect a chairman and decide on what, if any, technical work could or should be done during the inter-sessional period. This work could either be undertaken by the committee in the inter-sessional period or commissioned by it for others to carry out. It would also decide on what other necessary preparatory work should be undertaken so that

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

delegations would be best prepared to begin the negotiation in earnest in the 1995 session. It could, for example, provide for the creation of a group of experts (either national experts or experts drawn from appropriate organizations or a combination of both) to conduct preliminary technical work to be of assistance to all delegations at the start of 1995.

As I reported on June 30, the majority of groups and delegations with whom I have consulted are prepared to accept a negotiating mandate based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75L, of 16 December 1993. I would strongly encourage other delegations to join this majority, and so advise me either bilaterally or through their group in the shortest possible time. Let me reiterate the form I believe such a mandate could take:

"1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a 'Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.

"2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

"3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session."

These three points replicate the substantive section of the 1993 General Assembly resolution which is now acceptable to a majority of groups and the majority of those States with whom I have consulted. I would state again that the proposed mandate does not preclude delegations from discussing in the ad hoc committee the appropriate scope of the convention or any other matter relevant to it.

As for the next steps, once I have been advised informally that all groups are satisfied with the mandate along the lines just proposed (or any other on which groups might agree), I would then propose to convene an informal meeting to confirm consensus on the negotiating mandate, then submit it for approval to the plenary.

We have made substantial progress which I think is of fundamental importance in achieving our objectives on this vital issue. It is my earnest hope that in the next few days we will complete this work.

Mr. KELLER (Germany): Mr. President, would you kindly allow me to make a statement regarding Working Group 1 of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. We promised that we would be circulating the revised version of the draft head treaty within the plenary, but due to technical reasons we have had to postpone this and it will now be circulated this afternoon in the margins of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances.

The PRESIDENT: I am sure that the distinguished delegates have taken note of this statement.

(The President)

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in extensive consultations with the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It is so decided.

That concludes our business for today. However, before adjourning, I wish to remind you that this meeting will be immediately followed by a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 11 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.687
11 August 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat (Indonesia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 687th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I have no speaker inscribed on the list for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

If not, I would like to make some closing remarks as Indonesia's presidency comes to an end. Thereafter I propose to take up for decision the request received from Spain to participate, during the third part of the session, in the work of the Conference.

Distinguished delegates, this being the last occasion on which I preside over the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to make a few concluding remarks before closing our business for today.

The Conference on Disarmament is entering the final stages of negotiations in which all its subsidiary bodies are now preparing the report to be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament for approval, to be subsequently presented to the upcoming General Assembly of the United Nations. It is indeed gratifying to note that, apart from preparing the technical part of the report, the Ad hoc Committee on NTB chaired by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Marín Bosch, continues its intensive negotiations on substantive issues in which both the chairmen of Working Group 1, on verification, and of Working Group 2, on legal/institutional issues, Ambassadors Hoffman and Dembinski, have respectively managed to produce material which can be further developed to form expeditiously a rolling-text for a CTBT, hopefully during the envisaged intersessional period.

Serious efforts have also been deployed by the chairmen of the other Ad hoc Committees, namely on TIA, NSA and on PAROS, in preparing their final reports to the Conference in a timely fashion. I wish to take this occasion to express my appreciation to them for the efficient manner with which they have conducted the work of their respective subsidiary bodies. As far as the issue of a cut-off treaty is concerned, I would like to encourage the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, to spare no effort to bring about a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this item. In the same vein, not being unaware of the magnitude and difficulties of the task facing Ambassador Norberg, I am nevertheless confident that his efforts will pave the way toward the satisfactory solution to this question.

The other important and urgent subject which needs our continued attention is the expansion of the membership of the Conference, which is long overdue. Many ideas and proposals have been put forward, including the suggestion contained in the collective letter addressed to me by the Group of 23 countries listed in the O'Sullivan proposal, as to how this question should best be addressed and resolved. I am fully confident that under the able leadership of Ambassador Lampreia, the Friend of the Chair on this issue, an acceptable formula could be speedily found in order to respond to the legitimate wish of these countries to become full members of the Conference at the earliest possible date.

The President

To conclude, let me sincerely thank the group coordinators, and the Chinese delegation as well as the Indian and Iranian delegations, as members of the troika, for the precious support they have rendered to me in the discharge of my duties. Meanwhile, I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Nasserî of Iran, who is going to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament starting next week, for which I wish him every success. I pledge the fullest support of my delegation in helping him to carry out his responsibility. It would be remiss of me if I did not also take this opportunity to thank most sincerely the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, as well as his deputy, Mr. Bensmail, and their staff for the invaluable help they have extended to me during my tenure as President of the Conference. My thanks also go to my esteemed colleagues who presided over the Conference before me and who have greatly contributed to make my task easier.

As announced, I would now like to invite the Conference to consider the request received from Spain to participate, during the third part of the session, in the work of the Conference. The secretariat has distributed today a note from the President containing this request (doc. CD/WP.455). During the consultations I have been holding, there has been no objection to this request. In the circumstance, I propose that we adopt the recommendation contained in document CD/WP.455 directly in plenary, it being understood that this does not constitute a precedent for future occasions when an informal meeting might be necessary. May I take it that the Conference takes a decision to this effect?

It is so decided.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It is so decided.

That concludes our business for today. However, before adjourning, I wish to remind you that this meeting will be immediately followed by informal open-ended consultations on review of the agenda.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLÉS (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I should like first of all to take this opportunity to thank you for your excellent stewardship during your term at discharging the duties of President of the Conference. With reference to what you have just announced - that following this plenary meeting which we are on the point of concluding there will be consultations chaired by Ambassador Norberg on the topic of the agenda, I should like to take advantage of delegations' presence to say that, as we agreed yesterday in the presidential meetings that you chaired, if there is time available after Ambassador Norberg's consultations this delegation would like to take the opportunity to hold consultations on the report of the

Mrs. Bauta Solés

outer space committee. Although this information has been transmitted to the group coordinators, I think there has been so little time that it would be good to inform those present here too of the agreement we reached yesterday in the presidential consultations.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to confirm that indeed, consultations on this issue were held yesterday during the presidential consultations and indeed, should there be time left after the informal open-ended consultations on review of the agenda, there will, as announced by our colleague from Cuba, be informal consultations on the draft report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 18 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.688
18 August 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Sirous Nasserî (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 688th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I would like to extend a warm welcome to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mr. David Logan, who will be the first speaker today. Let me also welcome the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, who will address the Conference for the second time this year. The presence here today of these distinguished visitors is a demonstration of the sustained interest of their Governments in our work and of the importance they attach to the work of our Conference. I am sure the Conference is looking forward to their statements.

But let me first start by stating that it is a great honour for me to preside over the Conference on Disarmament. I shall endeavour, to the best of my ability, to conduct the work of the Conference effectively and efficiently as we prepare the final report of the 1994 session for adoption. I am, in this respect, much encouraged by the work of my predecessor and my friend Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia. I appreciate very much his wise leadership and the excellent guidance he offered to our work in the Conference. I thank also Mr. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and Mr. Bensmail, the Deputy Secretary-General, and his staff, whose assistance is an essential necessity for any success in our work.

The final years of the 1980s witnessed the end of the East-West conflict that had dominated international politics for more than 40 years. New avenues of cooperation opened up, as a result, allowing the United Nations as well as multilateral institutions to play a more effective role. In the cold war period the degree of interaction between East and West, embodied in the Warsaw and NATO establishments, was limited because confrontation tended to take precedence over cooperation. Dialogue, including dialogue on arms control, was pursued largely to reduce tensions and was generally limited to areas of mutual concern. This is bound to change in this new era and we should continue to witness more and more cooperation in all international issues and, particularly, in the area of disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament, like many other aspects of international politics, has been largely affected by the end of the cold war. Now, for the first time in its history, the Conference can engage itself extensively in producing major international disarmament agreements. In this context the Conference on Disarmament should, particularly, take a careful look at the ongoing changes in military postures and military doctrines in order to adapt itself more appropriately to the needs of the time and be enabled to respond to the expectations of the international community; expectations that are in tune with the changes in the political world and are indeed well justified.

Now that the international climate seems favourable, we should not miss any opportunity to explore all possibilities to move forward and move fast. The Conference is well placed, today, to deal effectively with nuclear weapons

(The President)

and other weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons. The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention is a clear manifestation of the capability and credibility of this Conference.

On nuclear issues, where nuclear deterrence has largely become an obsolete and irrelevant doctrine, new avenues need to be explored and the related agenda items revitalized. Nuclear disarmament should really now be the aim of our work and we must not spare any effort to make this goal realizable within a reasonable period of time. For the moment, however, early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is a first priority for all of us in the Conference. Progress has been encouraging in this regard, yet we should not lose sight of the fact that much work still lies ahead. I urge all delegations to cooperate for early preparation of a rolling text.

In the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space we had good progress this year. The Friend of the Chair on confidence-building measures and terminology produced very useful working papers which could streamline the work of the Committee in its future session.

On transparency in armaments, substantive discussions have taken place in the Ad Hoc Committee at this session. The result of these discussions bears much significance as it will be forwarded to the United Nations Secretary-General for the preparation of his report to the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances enjoys additional importance this year as the 1995 non-proliferation Treaty conference is directly ahead of us and I believe, therefore, that the report of the Committee will be examined with much interest. I hope the substantial discussions that have taken place in the Committee could lead to a promising conclusion.

On prohibition of fissile materials the Conference has not yet been able to establish the ad hoc committee on the issue due to lack of consensus on the mandate. Here, I would like to invite the delegations to make the best use of the short time we have left and endeavour to find a consensus formulation in this regard so that negotiations on a treaty may commence as soon as possible.

Concerning the expansion of membership of the Conference, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, as Friend of the President of the Conference, has embarked upon a series of wide-ranging consultations in order to find a compromise formulation which could command consensus. I have requested that he continue his consultations as the Friend of the President on this pressing issue and I thank him for his acceptance. I am certain that this question will be pursued with diligence. I shall render my full support to this with the hope that a solution may be reached soon. As regards the functioning of the Conference, previous discussions in the context of IEF have resulted in some positive changes helping the Conference to better organize its work and

(The President)

pursue its objectives more effectively. That work has been continued this year and further improvements are under consideration. We have also had the opportunity this year to take a closer look at the possibilities to ameliorate and trim up the agenda; work that is certainly worth the effort though it shall require more time for further consideration.

In a nutshell, I believe the Conference can fairly be judged to have progressed well in discharging its tasks for this year and I am certain that, during this final month of activity for 1994, we shall witness eager and enthusiastic participation by all delegations in the efforts to consolidate the outcome of the work this year and prepare and present a valuable report to the General Assembly.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Finland, Algeria and Australia. I give the floor to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mr. David Logan.

Mr. LOGAN (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament at an important moment in its history. We are coming to the end of a particularly useful session in which we have done some ground-breaking work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are also looking ahead to a crucial Conference next year on the future of the non-proliferation Treaty. I would like to focus on both of these, and, in particular, to outline our thinking on options for NPT extension.

Before turning to these issues, however, I wish to say a few words about the CD itself. First, my Government believes that the strength of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum would be substantially enhanced by the expansion of its membership. In particular, to continue to exclude from membership countries whose ratification of a CTBT will, in our view, be vital cannot but handicap our efforts. I strongly hope that the present impasse on this issue can be overcome so that all interested countries are fully engaged in the Conference's work. We continue to believe that all those countries that have applied so far should be admitted as members as soon as possible.

Secondly, I should like to stress the importance which the United Kingdom attaches to the work of the CD in the field of conventional weapons. History has shown that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons has contributed to countless conflicts and led to the loss of millions of lives - far more than have been lost through the use of so-called weapons of mass destruction. We were delighted when the CD finally took up its global responsibility in this area with the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for transparency in armaments in 1992. We are committed to playing a full and active role in this important committee, which we hope will produce concrete, practical proposals to increase openness and transparency in this vital area.

(Mr. Logan, United Kingdom)

Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have, rightly, been the focus of the CD's work this year. We have made important progress. I am glad to say that we are now on the verge of securing a goal that has thwarted the international community for over 30 years.

At the outset of our deliberations on a CTBT some observers expected a treaty to be completed within a few weeks. That was always unrealistic. Despite the hard work which so many members of the CD have put in, it long ago became clear that negotiation of a good treaty is not a simple matter and will demand considerable effort from all parties. I would like to emphasize the importance of concluding a good treaty. By good, I mean a robust and durable treaty that will have the widest possible adherence and will be effectively verifiable. This is essential if it is to make a meaningful contribution to our non-proliferation goals. We must make sure that we get the treaty right, even if it takes longer than we might like to do so. After all, we are looking to negotiate a treaty of unlimited duration from which withdrawal cannot be lightly undertaken.

I should emphasize that we have no interest in prolonging the negotiations unnecessarily. But equally, it would be mistaken to impose artificial deadlines for completing the negotiations if that would lead to an unsatisfactory treaty. We would be delighted if a satisfactory treaty could be agreed before the NPT extension and review conference is held in the spring of next year. But even if it were not, we are confident that the momentum now exists to carry these negotiations to a successful conclusion in due course. Artificial deadlines will not help that process. On the other hand, we have also made clear that our commitment to work constructively for a CTBT reflects our assumption that the NPT will remain in force as well.

Although we are now nearing the end of this year's formal negotiating session, and I know you have a busy autumn in front of you, both here and in New York, I hope it will be possible to make full use of all available time for inter-sessional work. This would leave us well placed to resume negotiations during the next session. The United Kingdom delegation will continue to play an active and constructive role. In particular, I am glad that we have been able to make available the expertise and experience of Dr. Peter Marshall as a Friend of the Chairman of the verification Working Group.

I wish I could be so optimistic about the proposed negotiation for a cut-off convention. Last year the United Kingdom stated its commitment to participate in negotiations on a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for explosive purposes. We understood then that there would be difficult issues to resolve in negotiating such a convention. For example, the precise scope of the prohibitions, the exact detail of verification arrangements, the financial implications of these arrangements, and the means of ensuring that all relevant States become parties.

But, like most others, we were quite prepared to get on with the business of negotiating solutions to these difficulties on the basis of last year's General Assembly resolution. We remain ready to do that. It is therefore

(Mr. Logan, United Kingdom)

frustrating and disappointing that a few States have stood in the way of this - by seeking, at a very late stage, to alter the scope of the mandate in a manner which destroyed the consensus established by the General Assembly.

The result of their action is that we now have no mandate at all. The rest of us are entitled to ask whose interests have been served by this. We hope those States who are preventing progress will think again, so that negotiations on this difficult but important topic can begin soon.

There is another difficult subject which over the years has been much discussed in the CD. I refer to the question of security assurances. We have long sympathized with the desire of countries that have renounced the nuclear option to obtain an assurance that they will not be the victims of nuclear attack. We have offered clear assurances on these lines for some time. We stand by these assurances.

At the same time we have been working with other nuclear-weapon States to try to devise a joint text on assurances which might offer further reassurance to non-nuclear-weapon States. The joint assurance that the United Kingdom, United States and Russia have offered to Ukraine, conditional on her accession to the NPT, is a timely example of the cooperation possible between the nuclear-weapon States. I hope that this will provide a useful basis for our further work in this area.

As members of the CD will know, we have also long offered a positive security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States in which we commit ourselves to taking appropriate action at the United Nations Security Council in the event of nuclear aggression or threat of aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State. As part of our work on assurances, we are willing to consider ways in which our positive security assurance could be further elaborated. This will not be easy. It is very difficult to specify a response to a hypothetical event, and we would not want to give the impression of in any way restricting the scope of the current assurance, which recognizes that the United Nations Security Council will be free to decide on a course of action. But we are willing to try.

I know that some countries believe that progress in this area should be taken into account in determining their attitude to extension of the NPT. We do not think that such a link is justified. We recognize the importance which many countries attach to security assurances. But, whatever changes might or might not be made in the coming months, no one should lose sight of the simple fact that non-nuclear-weapon States in the NPT already benefit from our assurances.

All the negotiations and discussions which I have just mentioned are of course taking place in the build-up to the NPT extension and review conference. Scheduled for April/May 1995, this Conference must take a momentous decision on the Treaty's future duration. I should therefore like to say a few words now about the options which we believe are open to the parties and about the option which we believe they should choose.

(Mr. Logan, United Kingdom)

Clearly any decision on the NPT's extension must conform with the provisions of article X, which explicitly provides for three different types of extension decision to be taken in 1995. It states that Treaty parties will meet 25 years after entry into force to: "decide whether the [NPT] shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." It seems therefore that the Treaty's negotiators deliberately formulated the language of article X.2 to restrict the extension to three options.

The United Kingdom's position on Treaty extension is well known. We aim to secure the Treaty's unconditional and indefinite extension. If the parties choose this option, no further decision need ever be taken by them. In our view no other form of extension decision would so clearly demonstrate States parties' commitment to support and maintain the Treaty.

Of the possible alternatives, a decision to extend the Treaty for a single fixed period would raise the problem of what would happen at the end of this period. The Treaty only provides for one conference on extension, the one to be held next year. Therefore, extension for a fixed period would imply termination of the Treaty at the end of that period. While it is theoretically possible to provide for a further extension conference, this would require Treaty amendment, and the amendment procedures are complicated. Any amendment would require not only the approval of a majority of parties - including all members of the IAEA Board and all five nuclear-weapons States - but also ratification by a majority of parties constituted in the same way. This would be a lengthy and cumbersome process which would risk unravelling the Treaty, and which could not under any circumstances be completed before the review conference takes place.

The third option - a decision to extend the Treaty by a series of fixed periods - would also cause problems. Difficult questions regarding the length of each period, the number of periods and the mechanism that would be needed to go from one period to the next would need to be resolved. As in the case of the fixed-period option, there is a risk that such mechanisms would require Treaty amendment.

In our view, both the fixed-period and fixed-periods options run the risk of undermining confidence in the Treaty and eroding support for it. Eventually this might even result in its expiration. Only indefinite extension will ensure that the Treaty endures, and that we have the best chance of preserving and building on the current level of nuclear security which is in all of our interests.

I make these comments because I think it is important that we are clear about what extension options are available to the parties under the Treaty. As you will know, the United Kingdom favours indefinite extension of the NPT. I want to underline that it remains our firm view that indefinite extension is clearly in the interests of all parties.

(Mr. Logan, United Kingdom)

The fact is that the NPT is essential to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. It provides a widely accepted framework for the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. It allows and encourages the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There is nothing wrong with this Treaty that cannot be put right by securing universal adherence to it, ensuring compliance with it, and continuing to work for the full realization of the aspirations it embodies. Nothing is gained by limited extension. Is there any NPT party that feels its security would be enhanced were the NPT to end next May? Or if the Treaty's long-term future was rendered uncertain? On the contrary, the security of everyone would be enhanced by indefinite extension.

Before I conclude, I would like to say a few words about the most pressing challenge currently facing the Treaty and its associated verification mechanism: I refer to North Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA. We firmly believe that any final settlement of this issue must include full transparency of North Korea's past, present and future nuclear programmes. We cannot afford to give the impression that the terms of the NPT and its associated safeguards agreements represent an *à la carte* menu from which parties can make a choice. We welcome the willingness of the new North Korean leadership to continue dialogue with the United States and to seek ways of resolving this problem. They should be in no doubt as to the determination of the international community to insist on full acceptance of their NPT obligations. But we hope that North Korea will demonstrate willingness to address the issue constructively in the next round of negotiations.

Our conclusions, therefore, are as follows: first, that we must sustain the excellent progress which has been made towards finally negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty; secondly, that we must overcome the artificial obstacles that have been put in the way of beginning negotiations for a cut-off convention; thirdly, that we must continue to address the issue of security assurances, while not forgetting that important security assurances have already been given to all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT; and lastly, that the NPT must be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. The United Kingdom is working hard to secure all these objectives, and will continue to do so.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his important statement. I now give the floor to the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. I am sure that the Conference will benefit from your diplomatic skills.

The ending of the cold war created a new world. The international community now faces unprecedented opportunities. At the same time, new conflicts around the world are a bitter reminder that new opportunities can also turn into new disasters.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

The effort of adapting international institutions - both regional and global - to the changed situation continues. The international community is seeking new, cooperative approaches to new security challenges.

The need for change extends also to disarmament. The multilateral arms control agenda and the working methods of the disarmament community should be reviewed to match the new realities. The work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be oriented accordingly. The Conference on Disarmament is already beginning to concentrate on issues that are important today. Finland supports further efforts to this end. We commend the work done by Ambassador Norberg as a Special Coordinator to update the agenda of the CD.

Arms control and disarmament efforts are not undertaken in a vacuum. The focus has shifted to non-proliferation efforts and to supporting conflict prevention and crisis management. Dealing with the excess military capacity accumulated during the cold war years presents another new challenge. Today's arms control agenda should centre around these tasks. To meet these new tasks, the input and involvement of countries around the world and in all regions of the world is of vital importance.

The need for a global approach highlights the urgency of reviewing the composition of the Conference on Disarmament. We regret the present deadlock which is undermining the credibility of the whole Conference. The Conference was last enlarged in 1978, an aeon ago as far as world politics is concerned. Yet the doors remain closed. Ultimately what is at stake is the role of arms control in today's world. We expect the present CD members to make every effort to include the proposed 23 countries as members soon, well before the end of the test-ban talks.

It is important to see arms control and disarmament in a wider context of international peace and security. We support the integration of multilateral disarmament with the United Nations activities related to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. The concepts presented by the Secretary-General in his report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" provided a valuable basis for the necessary follow-up.

The role of arms control treaties and the aim of seeking universal adherence to them have gained added significance. So have the need to insist on compliance with existing commitments as well as effective verification of actual compliance. International agreements on arms control and disarmament establish norms for responsible behaviour. It is vital for the security of all Member States that the United Nations is ready to act in accordance with its Charter if faced with grave violations of multilateral disarmament agreements.

Besides a credible framework of arms control agreements, cooperative security calls for measures that increase confidence between States. One could hardly seek cooperative security without trying to increase openness and transparency in military matters.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

Through confidence-building measures, a dynamic element can be incorporated into arms control. Such measures provide for early warning, but they can also be designed specifically for existing situations of tension so as to reduce the risk of conflict.

We find the work related to transparency in armaments particularly important, not only because it addresses conventional weapons that are being used every day in conflicts around the world, but because it introduces the element of confidence-building, a new one in the CD context.

So far, the CD has mainly been engaged in general discussion about transparency. We hope that next year the Ad Hoc Committee moves into elaborating concrete measures.

In this area, it may not always be feasible to strive for the traditional type of outcome, legally binding agreements. The CD could also look into possibilities of arriving at other types of specific outcomes, such as model agreements or politically binding commitments that could be endorsed through a General Assembly resolution.

In our view, the CD should contribute to building a universal basis for openness and transparency. The United Nations standardized reporting mechanism for military expenditures and the more recent Register of Conventional Arms are already two important elements of a global CBM network.

As regards the arms Register, in our view the priority at this point should be on consolidation and expansion of participation in this information exchange. We also agree with those who stress the need to expand the Register. Here it seems realistic to expect that the inclusion of new weapons categories and of holdings and procurement can only happen gradually and start with provision of information on a voluntary basis.

In the regional context, Finland welcomes the new steps taken by the ASEAN countries. Arms control and confidence-building plays an important part also in the Middle East peace process, where we have witnessed significant progress.

In Europe, where the lines of confrontation were most sharply drawn, confidence-building measures paved the way for reduction of offensive and destabilizing military capabilities and led to new cooperative approaches towards security. The legacy of the recent past is a difficult one: the geopolitical landscape has been transformed, new social and economic structures need to be built. Subregional tensions, even war, have re-emerged.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process is the broad framework for overcoming this legacy. It enshrines shared values and provides forums for security cooperation and conflict management. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and NATO's Partnership for Peace programme illustrate how profound the change has been - former adversaries are working

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

together for a better future. Now more than ever, it is a pivotal task for the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 1995 will be a watershed year in this regard.

Finland has been a staunch supporter of the non-proliferation Treaty from the very beginning. We remain so. The NPT has served and continues to serve our own security and well-being. We support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

Finland has put forward the candidature of Mr. Patokallio, Coordinator for Non-proliferation Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, for the post of Chairman of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference. His candidature has been endorsed by the NPT Western Group. We hope that his candidature will receive the support of all the other States parties as well.

Rapid conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a goal which Finland has long supported, would make a contribution to the success of the NPT 1995 Conference. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee under the able leadership of Ambassador Marín Bosch could come up with a comprehensive draft text still within this year's session. Such a rolling text would provide a good basis for continuing the drafting work intensively during the inter-sessional period.

Let me in this context reiterate our view that the test-ban treaty should be truly comprehensive: no nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, ever, anywhere. The treaty should contain an international verification system from the very beginning that would deter possible violators.

In our view, a functional interrelationship exists between verification of the test-ban treaty and the activities of IAEA. It should be duly reflected in setting up a CTBT organization.

Finland supports Ambassador Shannon in his efforts to find a consensus on the mandate for negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The consensus from the last General Assembly should be a good basis for initiating the negotiations. Better control of the existing stocks of fissile material is something that should also be addressed but, in our view, this should happen separately from the cut-off mandate, perhaps in the framework of IAEA.

A consensus on the cut-off mandate should, in our view, be followed by tasking an expert group to prepare the technical issues related to the verification of the future treaty during the inter-sessional period. In our view, the expert work could take place in Vienna. Such a solution would facilitate a smooth start of the negotiations from the very beginning of the next session.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

The assurances given to the non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear aggression have gained new importance from the non-proliferation perspective. States such as mine that have made an unambiguous non-proliferation commitment have the right to assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. As one way towards a universal legally binding agreement on security assurances, we could support an arrangement whereby uniform assurances are given through a Security Council resolution.

We welcome the dialogue between the nuclear-weapon States on security assurances. It is our hope that through this dialogue the nuclear-weapon States will soon be able to come out with their initiatives on how to get forward.

The Geneva Conference is engaged on issues instrumental to peace and stability in the world. We hope it can fulfil the expectations directed to it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his important statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOU (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I am taking the floor at the moment when you are occupying the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. Your talents as a diplomat augur well for the success of our work and will be very useful during this important period of preparation of the end-of-year reports. Our gratitude and esteem are extended also to your distinguished predecessors, the Ambassador of India, His Excellency Satish Chandra, and His Excellency the Ambassador of Indonesia, Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat, for the exemplary fashion in which they discharged their functions during the two previous terms of the presidency of the Conference.

My delegation has already taken advantage of the forum offered by this plenary to express its positions on certain items on the agenda of the Conference. It is taking the floor again today, when the third session is well advanced, to add a few clarifications on certain items that are important in our view.

I would like to begin by paying Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, a well-deserved tribute for the role that he is playing in order to make headway in our work. We also pay tribute to the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann and Ambassador Dembinski, as well as all the delegations that, either through direct contributions or through the assistance of their experts, have enabled the Ad Hoc Committee to embark resolutely on the task of drawing up a treaty.

Having said this, it must be noted candidly that the progress made, although significant, has not yet enabled us to settle certain fundamental points which might prove stumbling-blocks for the finalization of the treaty.

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

Moreover, we have noted demands that seem to us to affect the very spirit of the agreement secured on 10 August 1993, when the Conference decided to negotiate a comprehensive and universal, internationally and effectively verifiable test-ban treaty. By way of example, exceptions authorizing certain types of nuclear test would run the risk of opening the door to abuse of the treaty, which would then be devoid of meaning. Several delegations have indicated that to present as peaceful objectives being pursued through a nuclear test was a contradiction in terms. In the same line of thinking, we believe that the procedure we should adopt with regard to existing nuclear weapons is not that tests should be conducted from time to time to ensure that they are "safe" or reliable but that they should be purely and simply dismantled, in accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of States and repeated declarations in favour of disarmament.

We are nevertheless happy to note that the Conference has recovered a climate of cooperation and calm which it should never abandon. Discussions that have been going on since the beginning of the session are taking place in conditions which offer substantial grounds for hope. Now that the two working groups are basing their discussions on written documents, I would like to address certain elements of the future treaty. First of all, we think that nothing should be able to be interpreted as restricting or regulating the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technologies. This necessity is a condition for the universality of the treaty. Second, the treatment of questions dealing with the monitoring system has shown how much this depended on close and multifaceted cooperation among the States parties (for instance, the installation and link-up of the various monitoring networks, the setting up of inspection teams, the exchange of information, etc.). This raises the question of the differentiated capabilities of States in their participation in the monitoring systems and the benefit they will draw from it. Certain delegations have already expressed the willingness of their countries to provide technical and financial assistance to underpin this cooperation. We think we must begin to make this readiness tangible, in particular so as to reduce the time-lags needed to set up integrated monitoring networks, which some experts estimate will take years.

Third, a proposal has been made to define the bans on tests in the light of the environments in which they might take place. Such a choice would be likely to lead to numerous violations of the treaty. Certain States have a regrettable propensity to interpret international instruments in the light of narrow national interests. We think that a generic definition, such as a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments and for all time, seems desirable.

Fourth, participation in verification activities should have a non-discriminatory character, give equal rights and identical obligations to all States and ensure the application of the provisions of the treaty on equal terms.

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

Fifth, concerning entry into force, we think that at least all the nuclear-weapon States and all the countries with research programmes in the nuclear field or nuclear plants should accede to the treaty. However, we should try and find a mechanism that would prevent entry into force from being dependent on the particular will of one State or group of States.

Sixth, no State or group of States should have a permanent seat in any of the structures of the organization that will be set up under the treaty, or hold a right of veto. In particular, the membership of the executive council should be based on principles of rotation and geographical balance. This formula would not prevent a given region from designating the same State or States to represent it in the executive council, whenever it wished.

We would like to thank Ambassador Shannon for the efforts he is making in the context of his mandate and congratulate him on the results already obtained. Allow me to take this opportunity to recall that at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, Algeria was amongst those that called for a halt to the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and the production of fissile materials for military purposes. We subscribe to the view that the Conference on Disarmament, both on procedural grounds and for substantive reasons, is the appropriate framework for the negotiation of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, international and effectively verifiable agreement on the halting of the production of fissile material for military purposes. IAEA could enable the Conference on Disarmament to draw on its expertise for the establishment of a verification regime. Expertise from other bodies such as WHO, for instance, is also likely to be required.

The drafting of the mandate of the future ad hoc committee is of great importance. In this connection we think that United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L constitutes a sound starting-point for this delicate exercise, whose successful completion will call for a real spirit of compromise from all concerned. An agreement on banning the production of fissile material must have a verification system. It will not be possible to avoid the question of existing stocks. This major dimension must be clearly addressed in the definition of the mandate of the future committee.

This year again, despite the inventive and open spirit of Ambassador Guillaume, whose efforts we welcome, we have not managed to make headway on the question of negative security assurances. Countries renouncing the nuclear option have a legitimate right to be given guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, on the basis of an international multilaterally negotiated and legally binding agreement. By its very nature, this agreement should commit the States which have nuclear weapons vis-à-vis those which have none; any different formula would run counter to the notion of a balance of mutual commitments and would give rise to supplementary difficulties.

Banning the use of a weapon of mass destruction is not in the realm of Utopia, as has been proved by the precedent in the field of chemical weapons, which are more widespread. We think that an international agreement on

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, discussed at the multilateral level and enforceable, is a means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. This is why the refusal to recognize this claim is in itself a legitimate cause for concern. Recognition in a treaty of guarantees on the part of nuclear-weapon States would be a positive confidence-building measure which would help eliminate constraints arising out of apprehensions and suspicions about nuclear weapons.

On 31 May, my delegation introduced before this plenary, on behalf of the Group of 21, a proposal containing elements that could lay the basis for the elaboration of an international convention binding nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in regard to security assurances. We believe that this proposal is reasonable and addresses certain considerations that have previously been highlighted by the nuclear-weapon States. It is time for the Conference on Disarmament to respond positively to it.

The objective of transparency is to strengthen confidence and security, prevent armed conflicts and promote disarmament. When setting up the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments with its present mandate, the Conference on Disarmament emphasized the need to abide by the terms of resolutions 46/36 and 47/52 L. The difficulties it has encountered this year in drawing up recommendations which would enjoy consensus stem from the conviction of many delegations belonging to the Group of 21 that the proposals put before the Committee so far are generally speaking aimed at perpetuating, to the benefit of those that already enjoy military pre-eminence, a situation of inequality based on the overproduction of weapons, as well as a propensity to systematically seek military applications of scientific and technological progress. This conviction has been strengthened by the attitude adopted with regard to the legitimate concerns of the non-aligned countries relating to weapons of mass destruction and dual-purpose technologies - concerns which were restated just a few weeks ago at the ministerial conference in Cairo. Transparency cannot serve as a distraction from the need to halt the arms race. This is why we query the idea of renewing the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee in the circumstances that currently exist. Are we entitled to present the arms race as inevitable when the functions of research and development are under the direct influence of Governments and the end of the East-West conflict is capable of opening up a path to a genuine process of disarmament which would not be confined to sending to the scrap heap the weapons that constitute the greatest burden? There is nothing pre-ordained about the arms race, which is primarily the result of and depends on political decisions.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in space is closely connected to the entire complex of problems pertaining to nuclear disarmament. My country would like to see the adoption of concrete measures which can effectively impede an arms race in space while at the same time enabling missile technologies to be used for peaceful purposes. The Conference on Disarmament has sufficient expertise to enable it to draw up a series of confidence-building, transparency and predictability measures - even an agreement on confidence-building measures. Many proposals put forward thus

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

far in the context of the code of conduct form a cohesive whole whose adoption would not hamper either the devising of policies for space exploration by new States or the subsequent establishment of a minimum regime which would prevent an arms race in space, in particular by banning the placing of anti-satellite weapons in orbit.

Despite the laudable efforts of Ambassador Lampreia, efforts which we welcome, the problem of the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament has not had a positive outcome. Yet again this year the developments have not been fruitful. The lack of any alternative to the conclusions and recommendations of Ambassador O'Sullivan seems clearer now than ever. We think that it is time to respond to the resolve of States to become members of the Conference. The immediate increase of the number of member States to 60 should be complemented by the establishment of machinery that would allow the regular and controlled expansion of this forum.

We agree with those who have asserted that the world has changed. This is so evident that no particular effort is needed to reach this conclusion. One of the consequences of this new situation, we thought, should be greater democratization of decision-making in international bodies. As far as the Conference on Disarmament is concerned, the manner in which the Convention on chemical weapons was finalized reinforced this theory. Was this just a fleeting bright spot? This question is worth raising in the light of the conduct of certain delegations that give the impression - let us hope a mistaken one - that they are placing the discussions and negotiations in the context of efforts to preserve the status quo and defend the formula of unequal treaties.

The Conference on Disarmament would lose part of its essence if it forgot that, as its name implies, it has the task of negotiating disarmament agreements. The hope that we would like to voice is that when measures for arms control and disarmament are drawn up, efforts will be made to ensure that these measures are non-discriminatory, that they create genuine stability, that they are uniformly applicable to all States, that they establish a balance in terms of the responsibilities and obligations of States with nuclear weapons and those without, and that, lastly, as long as the goal of global disarmament has not been attained, the non-nuclear-weapon States will be able to benefit from assurances protecting them from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui, for his statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and also to commend highly the work of your predecessor, Ambassador Soemadi Brotodiningrat of Indonesia. I reaffirm

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

the deep commitment of the Australian delegation to cooperating with the presidency and other delegations to achieve the positive outcomes in this negotiating body on which Australia places such importance.

The critical role of arms control and disarmament in peace-building and in the development of cooperative security is an important element of the study on "Cooperating for peace" launched by Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, in response to the United Nations Secretary-General's call. As the Minister wrote, the very process of negotiating and concluding arms control and disarmament regimes "can have a highly beneficial impact on international peace and security as States agree, and are seen to agree, on the elimination of, or lower limits and controls on, armaments - in short, as they cooperate for peace".

In the post-cold-war environment the role of arms control and disarmament in cooperative security is one of increasing importance and enhanced potential. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures have been, and remain, central elements of international and regional efforts towards global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides the cornerstone for such efforts, has delivered benefits not just to international security in general, but specifically in terms of trade and other cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Australian Government believes that the fundamental underpinning of cooperative security and peaceful cooperation in nuclear matters provided by the NPT makes its indefinite extension in 1995 imperative. I would note that the recent meeting of the South Pacific Forum expressed the desire of its member countries to see the NPT extended indefinitely. The Forum also called for the early conclusion of the CTBT.

The Conference on Disarmament has been addressing these complementary arrangements - a comprehensive test ban, security assurances, and the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes. I would like to address each of these as well as other items on our agenda.

This body has been talking about a CTBT and to some extent preparing technically for NTB negotiations for years. And work on a possible arrangement has been undertaken intermittently for decades before this. The verification technologies under consideration are known and proven, though cost-effective international networks have to be developed. Against this background the importance of seizing the opportunity afforded by the consensus to ban testing and the restraint in testing by most nuclear-weapon States is obvious to us. Our efforts will be a litmus test of the CD's capability to respond to post-cold-war opportunities.

The CD is the world's disarmament negotiating body, but to speak plainly, this body does not have a long record of achievement. The CWC is its major product and that 20-year negotiation only produced results in the wake of the cold war and the hot war in the Gulf. Surely it is not necessary to have an international upheaval in order to imbue this body with the sense of urgency

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

needed to achieve results. That should flow from the unambiguous call by the international community for a priority effort, and such a call was made on CTBT at the last General Assembly.

My delegation sets no deadlines; we recognize that it is one thing to talk about negotiations and another to undertake them. The organizational task of processing a range of views and information into text is formidable. But these last few weeks have shown the value of addressing our task with an added sense of urgency. Delegations generally accept the need to produce a comprehensive and relatively coherent, though bracketed text, which does justice to the substantial products of our negotiations so far. If we are to achieve this and continue to get results beyond September we must retain that sense of urgency which is not driven by artificial deadlines, but by the sense of this body meeting the expectations of world opinion and seizing this historic opportunity.

Without this, there is a risk of losing the plot, of sadly drifting into years of protracted haggling. Let me be clear. We are not advocating a hasty, and thus possibly superficial approach to the negotiations. We are not proposing that States abandon basic national interests. But we are urging strongly that in the common interest States work actively and urgently to fit these around an agreement on a test-ban treaty that is tolerable to all the negotiating parties.

Security assurances are still relevant in this post-cold-war world and my delegation is disappointed at the lack of progress. In contrast to the demandeur/giver relationship of the past, the international community now has a strong common interest in ensuring that the limited utility of nuclear weapons in our contemporary world is underscored and given legal form, helping cap and roll back horizontal and vertical proliferation pressures.

The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to exercise leadership and provide a credible response to the reasonable expectations of the international community. This requires an arrangement which is binding and which provides significantly more than the existing unilateral declarations.

A resolution of the Security Council could be crafted so as to set in place a new and universal legal rule prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices against non-nuclear-weapon States. This would be a rule binding on all members of the United Nations and revocable only by means of a new resolution. Such a resolution - which once passed would take immediate universal effect - could have comparable international legal status to a multilateral treaty if drafted to reflect an intention to bind Security Council and other United Nations members, drawing on the Council's United Nations Charter authority. The resolution could provide updated and more explicit positive security assurances, recognizing the importance to certain regions of confidence that the Security Council and especially its permanent members, will act firmly in the event of nuclear aggression or threats of such aggression.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

We would envisage the beneficiaries of a contemporary security assurances package as only the non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the NPT or comparable multilateral non-proliferation undertakings, and are in compliance with the full-scope nuclear safeguards which verify these undertakings.

We believe the innovative "brainstorming" sessions convened by Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium in the NSA Ad Hoc Committee revealed a convergence on the principle that any future enhanced and binding security assurances package should apply only to those States which have themselves already made matching and binding commitments of this sort.

In crafting a new arrangement, it is our hope that the exceptions incorporated into existing negative security assurances could be reconsidered in the light of their relevance, or lack of it, in today's world.

My Government urges the nuclear-weapon States to take up this challenge quickly so that the disarmament and non-proliferation potential of a well-conceived security assurances package can be realized and can complement the benefits of indefinite extension of the NPT and a CTBT of indefinite duration.

We welcome the vigorous and untiring efforts of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, in his capacity as Special Coordinator of the initiative to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Like many others, we are disappointed that agreement on a mandate has escaped us so far. We find hard to understand opposition to basing the mandate on the consensus resolution of UNGA48. It will be a sad reflection on this body if this Conference cannot start negotiations after the world body has achieved consensus.

We continue to believe that the resolution provides a viable basis for a mandate, bearing in mind Ambassador Shannon's clear statement that the adoption of a negotiating mandate and creation of an ad hoc committee does not preclude discussion of the appropriate scope of the convention in that committee.

While Australia has not yet developed definitive ideas on the shape of a cut-off convention, we recognize the complexity of the issues and believe strongly that any process should, at an early stage, explore the technical and other elements of a concept still not well understood. A mandate to negotiate will enable a start to be made in clarifying such issues.

In a final remark on current non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the nuclear field, I would like to go beyond the direct responsibilities of this body. Australia welcomes the sustained and impressive efforts of African countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty for the African region. In this context I would like to pay tribute to Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo and his African colleagues, who have organized and directed the five experts meetings which have produced the draft treaty. Their persistence and energy in pursuing the objective of an African NWFZ have been key factors in the achievements so far.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

We encourage the finalization and opening for signature of this treaty as soon as possible. Like its counterparts, the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the African zone will make an important contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the enhanced security for the States of that region and beyond.

There is debate on the scope and value of the work in the area of transparency in armaments. We consider it a key element in efforts to reduce mistrust and miscalculation in the security environment, and an important component of cooperative security as advocated by the Australian Foreign Minister. The fact that there have been numerous practical proposals put forward in the TIA Ad Hoc Committee over the last two years is testament to the significance and relevance of this topic. We look forward to continuing attention to these and further proposals in the TIA Ad Hoc Committee next year. An important step towards increased transparency was achieved through the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The fact that the recent series of experts' meetings on the Register was unable to agree on expansion of the scope of the Register in no way detracts from the existing instrument. Priority should be given to promoting universal participation.

In this area more than most, regional efforts complement global measures. They constitute an important means of addressing the specific regional security context. A concrete example is the discussion of transparency approaches in the Asia-Pacific as well demonstrated by the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, held in Bangkok on 25 July. That Forum agreed to study a series of proposals for cooperative security and trust-building measures, many of which are premised on the principle of transparency, and all of which are tailored to the specific requirements of the region.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is an important item on the CD agenda, with the potential for valuable work when CD resources and agenda permit. The concerns of the outer space Ad Hoc Committee relate directly to the objectives of limiting WMD proliferation and strengthening cooperative security arrangements.

Australia supports the negotiation of arms control measures such as a ban on the deployment of space-based weapons. Progress on this long-standing goal should be possible in the post-cold-war world, though any global regime dealing with weapons in space must contribute to global stability, and not detract from it by automatically banning all military uses of space. These include essential arms control monitoring.

In the longer term, we believe this Committee could contribute to developing global norms on the use and testing of ballistic missiles. In this respect we reiterate our interest in proposals for a confidence-building measure involving pre-launch notification of space launches and ballistic missiles. Such a CBM could help promote peaceful space cooperation by removing suspicion about the possible diversion of technology to missile programmes of concern.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

We are disappointed that the issue of the expansion of the membership of the CD remains unresolved despite the significant amount of energy and creativity which has been put into finding a solution to this issue. As on issues of substance, the CD must respond to the expectations of the international community to enhance the representativeness of the Conference through expanded membership. In the meantime, I welcome the active engagement of new non-member States in the CD's work.

To conclude, I would like to draw the attention of delegations to important work on certain weapons under way in Geneva beyond the CD's own agenda. I refer to the problem of land-mines now being discussed by the experts group on the 1980 Convention on certain conventional weapons.

Australia advocates that Protocol II of the CCW, which deals with land-mines, should apply to non-international as well as to international conflicts. In Australia's view mines should not be exported to States which are not party to Protocol II. We believe it is also vital that in future, anti-personnel mines should be detectable and incorporate a self-destruct mechanism to ensure mines do not remain unexploded at the end of hostilities, threatening the lives and livelihood of the civilian population. It is also a useful protection for armed forces.

Last week a Minister of the Cambodian Government addressed the experts group. There are literally millions of mines left there, and tens of millions more in places like Afghanistan and Mozambique. We must seek feasible but direct solutions to this horror. Australia has, or has provided mine clearance teams in all three of these countries, but in the longer term we believe the only solution is the broad establishment of international standards along the practical and achievable lines we advocate.

There is a great need for action on land-mines, and the real concern of States and peoples provides an opportunity to strengthen the Convention and widen adherence. My Government urges all States which have not done so to accede to or ratify the Convention, and to participate in this work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr, for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. This concludes our list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see no request for the floor.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As you will see, next Thursday after the plenary meeting, it is planned to hold an informal meeting of the Conference to begin consideration of the technical parts of the annual report to the General Assembly, which is contained in document CD/WP.456.

(The President)

This document will be distributed, in all languages, to delegations in their boxes on Monday, 22 August. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. However, before adjourning, I wish to remind you that this meeting will be immediately followed by informal open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference. I also wish to announce that informal open-ended consultations on transparency in armaments will be held by Ambassador Boytha in Conference Room I immediately after this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 25 August 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.689
25 August 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 25 August 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Sirous Nasserî (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 689th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On behalf of the Conference, I am pleased to welcome the participants in the Disarmament Fellowship Programme who are with us for the first time today in order to follow the work of the Conference. I am sure they will benefit from exposure to this forum, especially at a time when it is engaged in intensive negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I wish them a fruitful stay in Geneva.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Malta, Ambassador Bartolo, who has just recently joined us in Geneva, and I therefore welcome him to Geneva and to the CD and I now give him the floor.

Mr. BARTOLO (Malta): Mr. President, allow me to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference and by assuring you of my delegation's full cooperation and support. I wish you every success during your term as President of the Conference. As the recently appointed Permanent Representative of Malta, I also look forward to working closely with the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail, and the secretariat.

I wish today to refer to the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I would also like to refer to issues relating to security in the Mediterranean.

In June of 1993 the delegation of Malta had stated that Malta was interested in the pursuit of disarmament and its implications. Malta had urged those States with military arsenals to intensify their efforts towards reduction of armaments and to build mutual confidence and trust, which was the basis of this process. Malta had also stated that the non-proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely and today calls upon other States that have not yet made such declarations to do so.

The expectations are high for the international community to conclude a speedy and comprehensive test-ban treaty. The steady momentum which has been maintained throughout this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament represents a clear indication that its deliberations and negotiations could result in such a test-ban treaty. A number of delegations have expressed their views on this matter and a number of key issues have already been discussed. However we understand that more time is needed to consider the converging views. As was done during the negotiations that led towards the chemical weapons Convention, we feel that the time has come for a first draft of a rolling text as a basis for the future work of the Conference on Disarmament which undoubtedly would facilitate the work of delegations in the months to come. Nuclear-weapon States have more responsibility and are better suited to conduct negotiations that would lead to a CTBT.

Nuclear weapons have proliferated over the decades and we should keep in mind that the impact and size of such weapons remain a threat to the security of other States be these nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States. A CTBT should

(Mr. Bartolo, Malta)

ban all nuclear test explosions and such a ban should leave no loopholes and be universal. The task ahead for the Conference on Disarmament is critical and we have to respond to the expectations of the international community.

The actions of certain States have demonstrated that they possess the potential, capability and inclination towards producing nuclear weapons. This poses a major concern for all States in all regions. The prospects of a CTBT that would reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty and the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime therefore should encourage those States deeply involved to intensify the negotiations and reach compromise solutions that would ensure the widest possible adherence to the Treaty and that such Treaty is internationally verifiable.

The Mediterranean region faces various problems ranging from economic to social disparities, pollution of the environment, arms proliferation, conflicts, and in recent years the escalation of nationalism and extremism. These problems lead to insecurity and instability which destabilize our region.

The dramatic changes that took place in the international political environment after the end of the cold war and the recent positive ongoing developments in the Middle East are leading to initiatives that should enhance security, stability and cooperation in the region.

The concept behind the establishment of the United Nations arms Register was to foster openness among States regarding military matters. The Register aims at fostering transparency which is seen as a confidence-building measure for building trust among nations and for promoting progress towards disarmament. CBMs can foster peace and security in the Mediterranean when accompanied by cooperative measures in the political, economic and other fields. It is in this regional context that the United Nations arms Register provides a viable mechanism by promoting transparency in the field of military capabilities of States. We have to acknowledge however that the arms escalation in the region is evident, and goes beyond conventional weapons. Tactical ballistic missiles, chemical and bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction if further developed endanger the region. The exclusion of weapons of mass destruction from the United Nations Register is a major shortcoming that weakens the Register.

It is pertinent to state that the changes which have taken place in Europe are relevant to the Mediterranean region and that economic, social, political and security developments in that region can have a bearing on Europe. Malta has been in the forefront to promote cooperation in the Mediterranean, through initiatives and dialogue with the Mediterranean States in different forums.

In Helsinki II, on Malta's proposal, the CSCE has become the regional arrangement for peace-keeping in terms of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Malta has sponsored the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and has also proposed a Council of the Mediterranean.

(Mr. Bartolo, Malta)

Within such initiatives and responding to the needs of a dynamic Europe, Malta will also be examining the possibilities of being involved in the Partnership for Peace resulting from the NATO summit. This would ensure a closer form of cooperation with the Western European Union particularly in the new areas of peace-keeping and humanitarian activities. Malta will also be participating in the activities of the Mediterranean Forum launched recently in Alexandria, Egypt. In such forums, Malta will continue its active participation and will continue to express concern on emerging issues that affect our region. As stated by our Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs recently, "we have kept our contacts with countries in the region, believing that a process of dialogue is more conducive to peace than a process of wall-building".

It is within the process of such activities that Malta sees the Mediterranean as a test case of the overriding security challenge facing the international community. The Mediterranean is an important arms-importing and arms-producing region and available data indicates this fact. In short, the time has come to address security issues and disarmament matters of this region and examine those confidence-building measures that will foster peace and security for our future generations. This is the challenge of the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Malta for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

I feel duty bound, as President of the Conference, to impress upon all delegations, at this crucial time when we are striving to prepare our annual report to the General Assembly, the importance of displaying flexibility, good will and a spirit of compromise to enable us to overcome the obstacles facing us. I believe we are all aware of the difficulties currently being encountered in the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances and I hardly need to stress the importance for all of us to keep in mind the implications of a failure to agree upon a substantive report in that Committee. Let us remind ourselves that this Conference, in all instances, has been able to sum up its work and present substantive reports to the General Assembly. I am sure that if all of us keep in mind our accumulated experience and the established procedures that have traditionally guided our work, we will be able to see our way forward. Therefore, I should like to encourage all delegations to extend their full cooperation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, Ambassador Guillaume, in order for him to be able to finalize his report to the Conference.

I should also like to take this opportunity to appeal to all delegations to show flexibility in order to assist the Special Coordinator on "cut-off", Ambassador Shannon of Canada, in his untiring efforts to bring about a compromise on the mandate for an ad hoc committee on this important item.

May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies? This timetable has been prepared in consultation

(The President)

with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As you will see, provision has been made for one final meeting each for the committees on transparency in armaments and negative security assurances for the finalization of their reports. As agreed, all other meeting slots have, at this stage, been reserved for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its two working groups. It should be borne in mind, however, that should the need arise for a meeting on "cut-off", the timetable will have to be adjusted accordingly. So, on the understanding that the timetable is indicative and may be changed, if necessary, and with additional changes for Tuesday, 30 August (in fact, this is not a change, this is now an undetermined situation turning into a determined situation), we will have for the morning and afternoon of Tuesday, 30 August, Working Group 1 of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee - both for the morning and afternoon, we will have Working Group 1 meetings. With that change in mind, I suggest that we adopt this timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, I would like to take the opportunity offered by this plenary meeting to make a final solemn appeal to all delegations to display statesmanship. You know that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee is deadlocked because, despite all my efforts, I have been unable to secure consensus on the structure of the report. The mandate given to the Committee calls on it to make a report. If I am unable to secure consensus from the delegations on this structure, there will be no report and I will have failed in my duty. We repeat over and over that the CD is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum; but to negotiate, you need resolve to arrive at a result and a spirit of compromise. It is now a question of minutes, not hours, because if by 4 p.m. this afternoon I do not detect this resolve to negotiate, this spirit of cooperation and this acceptance of compromise, I will be obliged to draw the appropriate conclusions in the Ad Hoc Committee. That is why I take the liberty of making this final solemn appeal to all delegations, to enable us to produce this report.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Guillaume for his comment and, indeed, for his appeal. I give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, thank you for your admonitions to all of us with respect to the role I am attempting to fulfil as Special Coordinator for cut-off, and I certainly do share your hope and expectation that flexibility can be shown by all concerned to enable us to get a negotiating mandate during the few days remaining to us in this session. There will be a meeting of issue coordinators this afternoon at 3 p.m. and I hope we will begin the process of completing our work on the mandate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Shannon for his comments. Are there any further comments? I see none. I therefore should also like to remind you that this meeting will be followed by informal open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference, chaired by Ambassador Kamal, and if time permits, which I hope it will, these consultations will be followed by an informal plenary meeting to begin consideration of the technical parts of the annual report to the General Assembly.

This concludes our business for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 1 September 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.